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WHAT IS THIS CASE DOING HERE? 
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
Steven M. Schneebaum 
I. 
In March 2001, I was a member of a team of lawyers who repre-
sented the plaintiffs in a case called Doe v. Lumintang before the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia.1 We put on evidence that an Indo-
nesian major general, Johny Lumintang, had given direct orders in 1999, as 
the Indonesian military withdrew from the country now called Timor-Leste 
(East Timor), for the brutal massacre of civilians.2 The defendant was Depu-
ty Chief of Staff of the Army, and in later years rose to the rank of lieuten-
ant general.3 We argued that he was civilly liable, under the doctrine of 
command responsibility, for the torture and killing of eight individuals who 
were our clients or our clients’ decedents.4 Jurisdiction was invoked under 
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, enacted in 1789, under 
which the federal courts may hear tort cases brought by non-U.S. citizens 
alleging violations of international law.5 
Most of our clients had never been off their home island before. 
They were illiterate and, by the time they arrived in Washington for trial, in 
deep culture shock. Their testimony was mostly given in Tetum, a language 
  
  B.A. Yale, M.A. Oberlin, B.A. and M.A. Oxford, M.C.L. (A.P.) George Washington 
University. Mr. Schneebaum is a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Fox Rothschild, 
LLP, and has just begun his 22nd year as Professorial Lecturer in international and constitu-
tional law at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University. 
 1 Doe v. Lumintang, No. 00-674 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2001), appeal dismissed, 2005 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 13962, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The district court’s decisions—the two in the 
plaintiffs’ favor by Magistrate Judge Kay and the ultimate dismissal by Judge Kessler—are 
unreported. 
 2 See Lumintang, No. 00-674, slip. op. at 29 (“It has been established by the default 
judgment and by testimony at trial that Lumintang had responsibility for the actions against 
plaintiffs and a larger pattern of gross human rights violations.”). 
 3 Id. at 4, 7.  
 4 Id. at 6, 30. 
 5 Id. at 1; Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (West 2011); see also CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., 14A FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3661.1 (3d ed. 2011) 
(“There is also federal court jurisdiction under Section 1350 of Title 28, which has its roots 
in the Judiciary Act of 1789.”).  
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spoken by fewer than half a million people around the world.6 The key doc-
uments, written in Bahasa Indonesia, were unintelligible in their original 
form to anyone in the courtroom. 
Magistrate Judge Alan Kay listened as witnesses testified about 
East Timor’s decades of struggle for independence from Indonesia. We pro-
duced aerial photographs, and had an expert explain the devastation that he 
could read in those pictures: something like 75% of the man-made struc-
tures on the island were destroyed as the Indonesian forces decamped, 
knowing that they could no longer govern what they considered a province 
of their country, but determined to leave behind such ruin and misery that 
no one else would be able—or would want—to do so either.7 
We heard a mother testify about her futile efforts to keep her young 
son from fleeing their village to join pro-independence militias in the jun-
gle. “All who stay in the village will be killed,” explained the young man. 
His mother replied, “It does not matter. At least we will all die together.” He 
left; she never saw him alive again. The testimony of this woman, barely 
four feet nine inches tall and terrified, like the eerie silence as she and then 
the interpreter spoke, was searing and unforgettable. 
The other side of the courtroom was empty. Neither General Lu-
mintang, who had been personally served with process at Washington Dul-
les International Airport while on a visit to the United States, nor the Gov-
ernment or Embassy of Indonesia, had entered an appearance in the litiga-
tion. 
In the end, Judge Kay authored a denunciation both passionate and 
scholarly of the defendant’s violation of numerous norms of international 
law, finding him liable for $66 million in damages.8 At that stage, and in 
light of the limited but devastating press coverage of the decision, the Indo-
nesian Embassy filed a petition for leave to answer the complaint, which 
was granted, followed by a motion to dismiss, which was denied.9 The Em-
bassy then, on behalf of General Lumintang, appealed from the judgment of 
the Magistrate Judge to District Judge Gladys Kessler, who reversed, albeit 
  
 6 See Paul M. Lewis, Tetun, ETHNOLOGUE: LANGUAGES OF THE WORLD, http://www.ethno 
logue.com/show_language.asp?code=tet (last visited Feb. 9, 2012) (Tetum is also known as 
Tetun, Tetung, and Belo, among others).  
 7 See World: Asia-Pacific UN Wants $200m for East Timor, BBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 1999), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/487181.stm (“The UN said that the scope of devasta-
tion in the territory was extraordinary, with 75% of its people displaced and 70% of the 
buildings destroyed in looting and attacks set off by the 30 August independence referen-
dum.”).  
 8 Lumintang, No. 00-674, slip. op. at 42–43.  
 9 Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and 
Order and Judgment on Damages at 36–37, Doe v. Lumintang, No. 00-674 (D.D.C. filed 
March 25, 2002); Report and Recommendation at 24, Doe v. Lumintang, No. 00-674 
(D.D.C. filed March 3, 2004).  
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with open and declared reluctance: service of process had been affected 
outside of the District of Columbia, and was therefore invalid.10 The case 
was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.11 Given 
the wording of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding 
territorial constraints on proper service, there was little basis for appeal.12  
The case against Johny Lumintang was by no means my first foray 
into ATS litigation. I was counsel for three nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) as amici curiae in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 
1980), and sat at counsel table in New York City as Peter Weiss delivered 
the historic and powerful argument that led to the landmark Second Circuit 
decision.13 I have appeared as counsel or have represented amici in numer-
ous cases since then, have authored over a dozen law review articles, and 
have given countless speeches on this topic. 
In this Symposium on “International Law in Crisis,” and as part of 
the panel tasked with discussing “International Law in U.S. Courts,” how-
ever, I want to raise a question that has not been widely discussed among 
human rights advocates (although it is frequently raised by our critics): is it 
sensible, and is it right, for a court in Washington, D.C., established under 
the United States Constitution and operating under laws enacted by the 
United States Congress, to use its limited time and resources to hear a case 
like Doe v. Lumintang? There is, after all, an undeniable backlash against 
the hearing of such cases. What do we say to a federal judge who asks, 
plaintively, “What is this case doing here?” 
II. 
If this question is understood simply as a legal one—i.e., is it proper 
as a matter of law for a U.S. court to exercise subject-matter and personal 
jurisdiction in a case like this?—then the answer is easy. No less than the 
United States Supreme Court, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain14—over the ve-
hement protests of the Bush Administration then in power—unsurprisingly 
  
 10 Memorandum Setting Forth Objections of Defendant to the Report and Recommenda-
tion Issued by Magistrate Judge Alan Kay from Defendant Major General Johny Lumintang, 
Doe v. Lumintang, No. 00-674 (D.C. Cir. filed March 23, 2004); Memorandum Opinion, 
Doe v. Lumintang, No. 00-674 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2004). 
 11 Judge Kessler noted that she was “constrained” to reach this result, and did so “with 
great regret.” Memorandum Opinion at 1–2, 13, Doe v. Lumintang, No. 00-674 (D.C. Cir. 
filed Nov. 10, 2004). 
 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) (establishing personal jurisdiction over defendant if he is not 
subject to jurisdiction in any other state’s court of general jurisdiction).  
 13 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that jurisdiction is 
proper under the ATS when an alleged torturer is served with process by another alien within 
U.S. borders).  
 14 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).  
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concluded that the venerable ATS says what it means and means what it 
says. That is, the district courts do have subject-matter jurisdiction over any 
suit, brought “by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law 
of nations or a treaty of the United States.”15 The law of nations today in-
cludes norms of the international law of human rights. If personal jurisdic-
tion can be obtained over a prospective defendant accused of violating those 
norms, there is no reason why such a suit cannot go forward.  
Justice David Souter, speaking for the Court in Sosa, made clear 
that not just any alleged violation of international law—or even of funda-
mental human rights—will sustain the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
federal courts under the ATS.16 To prevail, an ATS plaintiff must allege, in 
a manner capable of surviving the standard challenges against vague, con-
clusory, or inadequately pleaded complaints,17 and ultimately must show 
that the rule claimed to have been violated by the defendant was “specific, 
universal, and obligatory.”18 And, of course, as my team was reminded in 
Lumintang, like any civil plaintiff, an ATS claimant must properly obtain 
personal jurisdiction, must serve process within the rules, and must observe 
other procedural constraints, such as applicable statutes of limitations.  
Moreover, other defenses normally available to civil defendants in 
cases spanning borders may be deployed here. In appropriate circumstances, 
for instance, a defendant may look for protection behind the doctrines of act 
of state,19 forum non conveniens,20 or political question (equitable absten-
tion).21 Or, he or she may claim entitlement to sovereign immunity under 
federal statute22 or, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Samantar v. 
  
 15 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 16 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738 (“It is enough to hold that a single illegal detention of less 
than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arrange-
ment, violates no norm of customary international law so well defined as to support the crea-
tion of a federal remedy.”).  
 17 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“[A] complaint must contain suffi-
cient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”) 
(quoting Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  
 18 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (“Actionable violations of international law must be of a 
norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.”) (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human 
Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).  
 19 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964) (explaining 
the origin and nature of the act of state doctrine). 
 20 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 251, 263 (1981) (discussing the ra-
tionale behind forum non conveniens). 
 21 See, e.g., Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 559 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he purpose of the 
political question doctrine is to bar claims that have the potential to undermine the separa-
tion-of-powers design of our federal government.”). 
 22 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1350.  
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Yusuf,23 in appropriate circumstances according to a suggestion to that effect 
by the Department of State.24 
However high the barriers to permission to proceed may be, certain 
principles of the law of nations have been deemed by the courts to be “spe-
cific, universal, and obligatory,” and thus to permit federal jurisdiction over 
well-pleaded charges that their violation by named and served defendants 
have injured identifiable plaintiffs.25 From a legal perspective, then, there is 
no reason for the courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction in these cases, 
which arise within the four corners of a statute that has been on the books 
very nearly as long as the United States has been an independent country. 
When federal law establishes a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, 
it is exceptional for courts to decline to exercise that jurisdiction because of 
foreign policy considerations. Our courts have long accepted in principle the 
notion—in the famous words of Mr. Justice Grey in The Paquete Haba-
na26—that “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained 
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often 
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determi-
nation.”27 Nor was that concept novel even at the threshold of the twentieth 
century: it may be found in the self-imposed obligation recorded by Thomas 
Jefferson in the Declaration of our Independence, not only to explain the 
colonists’ revolutionary intentions to demonstrate a “decent respect to the 
opinions of mankind,” but also to insist that the new Republic take its place 
as a coequal member of the community of sovereign nations.28 
There are, of course, exceptional situations in which adjudication of 
a dispute before a court might actually damage the ability of the executive 
branch to conduct the foreign policy of the United States without interfer-
ence from the judiciary.29 But few are the ATS lawsuits in which the federal 
government has urged the courts to reject claims, or to abstain from hearing 
them, because of such concerns.30 ATS cases, after all, usually involve alle-
  
 23 Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S.Ct. 2278 (2010) (holding that FSIA immunity does not apply 
to foreign officials sued in their individual capacity). 
 24 See id. 
 25 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (citing In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 
at 1475). 
 26 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
 27 Id. at 700. 
 28 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
 29 The Supreme Court has held that only in very limited circumstances may a court decline 
to adjudicate a case because it raises “political questions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 
(1962). While foreign affairs powers are generally granted to the Executive under the Consti-
tution, Justice Brennan for the Court admonished that “it is error to suppose that every case 
or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.” Id. at 211. 
 30 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981) (referencing the “never-
ending tension” between judicial and political branches in foreign affairs). 
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gations that a particular individual, in the course of carrying out a public 
commission, violated the victims’ fundamental human rights, by ignoring a 
jus cogens norm such as the one forbidding torture. It is rarely in the inter-
ests of the United States to align itself with someone credibly accused of 
such conduct, in seeking to immunize him against individual liability. 
And since the Supreme Court opined on the meaning of the ATS in 
Sosa for the first time in the more than two centuries the statute has been on 
the books, the lower courts have continued to declare certain ATS cases to 
be well within the four corners of the law. Thus, for example, a district court 
found jurisdiction in a case alleging that a program to eradicate cocaine 
planting in Colombia might have entailed the liability of a U.S.-based con-
tractor for violating the law of nations.31 Nigerian children were permitted 
to proceed in an action alleging that a drug company experimented on them 
without their knowledge or permission.32 And a court in Miami ordered a 
former Honduran military intelligence chief to pay $47 million in damages 
to six survivors of torture, and to the families of individuals forcibly “disap-
peared” under his command.33 
The statute is again before the Supreme Court during its current 
term, for a determination of whether and when corporations or other private 
actors, acting in partnership with public bodies, may be liable either for 
committing human rights abuses or for aiding and abetting abuses perpetrat-
ed by their joint venture partners.34 But the efforts of those who would de-
clare all of international law to be non-normative, to be nothing more than 
aspirational if that, have—for the moment at least—failed. 
  
 31 See Arias v. Dyncorp, 517 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that Ecuadorian 
residents had a claim against a U.S. contractor under the ATS). 
 32 Abdullahi v. Pfizer Corp., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the prohibition on 
nonconsensual medical experimentation on human beings was a universally accepted norm 
of customary international law, and therefore fell within the jurisdiction of the ATS), cert. 
denied, 130 S.Ct. 3541 (2010). 
 33 See Reyes v. Grijalba, Case No. 02-22046 (S.D. Fla. 2007). For in-depth analysis of this 
and numerous other post-Sosa cases in which it represented the plaintiffs, see the website of 
the Center for Justice and Accountability, www.cja.org. I have served for several years on 
the Legal Advisory Council of CJA. 
 34 This question has been answered affirmatively in a number of district and circuit court 
decisions. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Second Circuit became the only 
federal circuit to reject the principle that a corporation can be liable under the ATS for violat-
ing the law of nations. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), 
reh’g en banc denied, 621 F.3d 111 (2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). Contra 
Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) (permitting a plaintiff in an 
ATS case to pursue a corporate defendant on an “aiding and abetting” theory), reh’g denied, 
343 Fed. Appx. 600 (2009); Flomo v. Firestone, 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (2011) (“The factual 
premise of the majority opinion in the Kiobel case is incorrect.”). For an update to Kiobel, 
see infra note 85. 
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As a matter of law, therefore, it was perfectly proper for Magistrate 
Judge Kay to hear and to decide the Lumintang matter. And it must—if 
grudgingly—be conceded that it was perfectly proper for Judge Kessler 
thereafter to apply standard rules pertinent to civil cases in general, and to 
decide on that basis that an irremediable error in service of process and es-
tablishing personal jurisdiction doomed the case. Those premises mandated 
reversal of its outcome. 
That something happens to be consistent with a strict application of 
legal principles, however, does not necessarily mean that it is sensible. It 
certainly does not mean that it is right. Honest inquiry requires that we con-
tinue to pursue those questions. 
III. 
If I am correct so far, and there is no strictly legal impediment to 
U.S. courts hearing human rights cases arising overseas so long as the de-
fendant can be found and the well-pleaded allegation against him or her 
involves a suitably clear prohibition, the remaining issue is whether this is a 
rational result. This question is not, of course, one for judges to resolve, in 
our system of separation of powers. It is up to the political branches to pro-
pose or to enact a change to the statute if, as written, it is incoherent, waste-
ful, or counterproductive. 
I want to explore three kinds of arguments urging that cases like 
Lumintang should no longer be permitted to play out before the American 
judiciary. These three arguments rely on assertions of (A) imperialism, (B) 
indeterminacy, and (C) inefficiency. Each suggests that the practice of pre-
senting allegations of human rights abuses to U.S. judges is fundamentally 
flawed and should be abandoned.  
A.  Imperialism 
The argument regarding imperialism is simply stated. It contends 
that the U.S. has no right—indeed, that no country has the right—to impose 
its legal system, or its legal sensibilities, on any other nation without its 
consent. Imperialism is commonly defined, after all, as the domination by 
one nation of another against the will of the latter, forcing it to subordinate 
itself to the dominant power’s economic, cultural, and/or political values.35  
A stronger form of the argument objects to any extraterritorial reach 
of domestic legal rules.36 A weaker form reserves its opposition to the ex-
  
 35 Peter Hatton, Imperialism, in DICTIONARY OF MODERN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 121–22 
(Michael A. Riff ed., 1987). 
 36 See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869 (2010) (holding that the 
presumption that federal law is not meant to have extraterritorial effect is applicable in all 
cases, whenever a party seeks to give any federal legislation extraterritorial effect); George 
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tension of jurisdiction over disputes that do not directly implicate the inter-
ests of the forum state, according to whatever delineation of the outer limits 
of those interests is generally accepted at the time by the community of na-
tions.37  
Both versions of the argument, contending that U.S. human rights 
jurisprudence is a form of cultural imperialism, ignore legal and practical 
principles that have been established for centuries. Both also take a view of 
international law itself that is impossible to reconcile with most people’s 
understanding of this country’s role in the world, and the world’s role in this 
country. 
International law has never—despite what seem to be prevalent 
public perceptions to the contrary—required that the reach of a domestic 
legal system stop “at the water’s edge.”38 The Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice (the League of Nations predecessor to the current International 
Court of Justice in The Hague) made clear that the international legal sys-
tem prohibits a state from causing its laws to impinge on the legitimate sov-
ereign interests of others, but so long as that pitfall is avoided, what is not 
forbidden is permitted.39 Nor is this principle some narrow legal precedent 
of restricted applicability. International commercial law and practice (the 
ancient “Lex Mercatoria”)40 have acknowledged for centuries the need for a 
uniform system of legal rules transcending national boundaries.41  
In the civil law context, it has long been internationally accepted 
that courts of one state may, and regularly do, apply the laws of another in 
adjudicating disputes properly before them, so long as the defendant and the 
  
P. Fletcher, Against Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 580, 582 (2004) (arguing that 
universal jurisdiction will lead to the fundamental injustice of double jeopardy). 
 37 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, International Implications of the 
Alien Tort Statute, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 245 (2004) (arguing that a broad interpretation of ATS 
will make federal courts instruments of judicial imperialism and damage international rela-
tions). 
 38 See generally David Solan, In the Wake of Citizens United, Do Foreign Politics Still 
Stop at the Water's Edge?, 19 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 281, 312 (2010) (exploring the impact 
of foreign influences in the U.S. legal system in the wake of Citizens United); Stephen J. 
Wayne, The Multiple Influences on U.S. Foreign Policy-Making, 5 U.S. FOREIGN POL’Y 
AGENDA 25, 27 (2000) (“The distinction between foreign and domestic as well as the one 
between national and international has become blurred. As a consequence, the pressure and 
players have multiplied as has the politics.”). 
 39 See The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) (reasoning that, 
without an express prohibition, sovereign states may behave as they wish). 
 40 Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial Transac-
tions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 221, 274–77 (1978) (analyzing the role of 
international custom in international commercial law and the codification of Lex Mercato-
ria). 
 41 Id. at 221. 
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subject matter are within the forum state’s jurisdictional reach.42 Again, 
disputes ranging from the most mundane to the geopolitical are regularly 
addressed in this way. No one would advocate limiting the scope of the in-
ternational commercial regime, or effectively permitting the breacher of a 
contract, or the perpetrator of a tort, to evade liability simply by removing 
herself to foreign soil. 
I am not limiting my reference here to universal jurisdiction, the 
theory under which states may use their criminal laws to punish the perpe-
trators of acts occurring far from their shores even absent any connection to 
their nationals, because it is alleged that those acts were, for example, sig-
nificant violations of basic human rights. To accept my argument that there 
is nothing imperialistic about applying one state’s law in the courtrooms of 
another does not require offering a warm embrace of the doctrine of univer-
sal jurisdiction. In the United States in particular, we reject the concept of 
“common law crimes,” insisting on a criminal code enacted through our 
constitutional system of legislation, not derived from the statements of in-
ternational organizations or the contents of unratified treaties, much less the 
vagaries of customary international law.43 Here, in other words, internation-
al law may motivate Congress to outlaw certain behavior, or to make it 
criminal under U.S. law even absent any obvious connection with the 
U.S.,44 but international law alone unaided by implementing legislation does 
not provide a sufficient basis for prosecution.45  
  
 42 Compare Hannah L. Buxbaum, Forum Selection in International Contract Litigation: 
The Role of Judicial Discretion, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RES. 185 (2004) (claim-
ing that increased cross-border judicial communication will increase transnational litigation), 
with Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
481 (2011) (arguing that the forum shopping system of the United States no longer encour-
ages foreign plaintiffs to file transnational suits in the United States). 
 43 The Constitution expressly reserves to Congress the power “To define and punish . . . 
Offences against the Law of Nations.” U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see also United States 
v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820) (finding that robbery upon the sea is piracy by the 
law of nations, and that it is constitutionally defined by an act of Congress). 
 44 Thus, for example, in 2000 Congress passed and President Clinton signed into law the 
Torture Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000), under which Charles “Chuckie” Taylor was then tried, 
convicted, and sentenced to prison for horrific crimes committed in Liberia. See generally 
Laura Richardson Brownlee, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the United States: American 
Attitudes and Practices in the Prosecution of Charles Chuckie Taylor Jr., 9 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 331 (2010). 
 45 There are, however, reported cases in which U.S. judges have deferred to foreign states’ 
invocation of universal jurisdiction to order the deportation of persons accused of crimes 
against humanity. One of those was tried and argued right here in Cleveland: Demjanjuk v. 
Petrovsky, 518 F.Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981), aff’d, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated, 
10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993). The author served as counsel for the International Human Rights 
Law Group as amicus curiae in Demjanjuk, and presented oral argument to Chief Judge 
Frank Battisti.  
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ATS and other human rights cases—civil litigation, in which plain-
tiffs claiming to be victims bring suit against persons alleged to have been 
perpetrators of human rights abuses—do not masquerade as attempts to 
vindicate the rights of society as a whole. They do not share the indicia of 
criminal prosecutions, in which “the People” or “the State” is the notional 
plaintiff. These are private cases, and the assertion of jurisdiction over them 
no more threatens the sovereignty of the place where the acts occurred than 
does the consideration by an English court of a breach of contract between a 
Japanese shipper and a Panamanian ship owner, or by the interpretation of a 
Moroccan court of a divorce decree issued in Oklahoma. 
To be sure, human rights cases may have in their sights the conduct 
or policies of a government. But in some such instances there are traditional 
ways for courts to limit themselves in deference to doctrines like act of state 
or equitable abstention. There is nothing imperialistic in holding a state of-
ficial civilly liable for acts committed in contravention of international 
commitments solemnly and presumably voluntarily undertaken by the coun-
try of her or his nationality. After all, if adherence to a treaty gives rise to 
legal obligations, there should be no standing to complain that an individual 
who is meant to be the beneficiary of those obligations has the right to have 
the facts and law tested by a judge, applying legal norms of specific ap-
plicability, when it is alleged that an agent of the state has violated them. 
There may be gray areas here, of course: the case in which, for ex-
ample, a state has signed but not ratified the applicable treaty or has been a 
persistent objector to the emergence of a customary norm.46 But these objec-
tions will not arise frequently. No state claims the right to torture detainees, 
or members of ethnic minorities, or political dissidents. Whether alleged 
abuse rose to the level of torture or was an acceptable use of coercion, 
whether it happened under the auspices of the state or was conducted by 
renegades not affiliated with public authority, or whether this individual 
defendant was the person who perpetrated or ordered the abuse or was him-
self or herself unable to alter it: all of these are subject to resolution in the 
normal course of judicial decision-making. They are fact questions, and 
judges and juries are paid to resolve such questions. There is no difference, 
  
 46 Holning Lau, Comment, Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in International 
Human Rights Law, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 495, 497–98 (2005). 
As one might gather, international norms develop over time; they do not simulta-
neously emerge and become law. During a norm's gradual emergence, some states 
may object to the norm attaining legal status. According to the persistent objector 
doctrine, these objectors shall be exempt from the norm after it becomes law, so 
long as the state can rebut the assumption that it acquiesced to the norm and prove 
that, instead, it exercised clear and consistent objections throughout the norm's 
emergence. 
Id. 
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in principle, between asking a New York court to determine whether a con-
tract for the sale of widgets between a Swiss seller and an American buyer, 
written in French and governed by Swiss law, was breached by the defend-
ant’s delivery of sub-standard goods, on the one hand, and asking that same 
court to decide whether the policy of ethnic cleansing embraced by the Re-
publika Srpska and orchestrated by its leader, Radovan Karadzic, justifies 
holding him civilly liable to women raped by Bosnian Serb troops under his 
direction, on the other.47 
B.  Indeterminacy 
It is sometimes argued that the problem with cases like Doe v. Lu-
mintang is not that a foreign court asserting subject-matter jurisdiction is 
being arrogant, but rather that, once such jurisdiction is claimed, identifying 
the norms governing the defendant’s liability is an impossible task for do-
mestic judges. The asserted vagueness of international law has been one of 
the main contentions underlying legislative and other efforts to preclude its 
use in U.S. courts. 
None less than Chief Justice John Roberts has written to the effect 
that some source of international law can be found to support almost any 
proposition.48 When the Supreme Court concluded that the practices of oth-
er nations should inform this country’s understanding of whether the execu-
tion of juvenile offenders is consistent with due process of law,49 or whether 
homosexual acts between consenting adults may be punished as crimes 
against the state,
50
 there were howls of protest, including some coming from 
dissenting Justices on the high court itself.51 And this reaction was motivat-
ed by precisely the concern that international law is not a fixed body of le-
  
 47 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) rev’g Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding that Bosnian Serb militias bore sufficient resemblance to agents 
of a state, and reversed the district court, which had accepted the defendant’s argument that 
the Republika Srpska, unrecognized by any disinterested state and certainly not recognized 
by the U.S., was therefore not a subject of international law at all).  
 48 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of 
the United States: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 200–01 (2005) 
(statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“In foreign law you can find anything you want. . . 
. Looking at foreign law for support is like looking out over a crowd and picking out your 
friends. You can find them. They're there.”). 
 49 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
 50 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 51 Justice Antonin Scalia has expressed his views from the Bench, but also from the podi-
um in many public forums, to the effect that foreign and international law has no business 
being used as a source of law by U.S. judges, except in cases in when necessary to interpret a 
treaty. A Conversation Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices: The Relevance of Foreign 
Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scal-
ia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 521 (2005)  
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gal norms, but is instead a fluid amalgam of such vague and unreliable 
things as scholarly writings that cannot be filtered even to exclude improper 
content, open ethnic biases, and outright prejudice against certain states and 
their economic, political, or cultural values.52 
But despite the protestations of those who consider international 
law not to be law at all, and who therefore find only confirmation of that 
view in its lack of “black letter” content, there are long-established proce-
dures for distinguishing among lex lata (hard law, generally accepted as 
such in the international community), lex ferenda (propositions that may 
reflect law in the making, but that do not constitute definitive contents of 
international law as it stands today), and what Professor Ralph Steinhardt of 
George Washington University calls “lex nada” (aspirational statements that 
we all might wish were the law, but that bear none of the indicia even of 
being en route to general acceptance).53 
Nor is it any kind of self-indulgence for the U.S. judiciary to devel-
op a jurisprudence capable of making these distinctions. After all, in The 
Paquete Habana, Mr. Justice Gray’s famous pronouncement was not only 
that “[i]nternational law is part of our law,” but that it “must be ascertained 
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often 
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determi-
nation.”54 In other words, given the canonical interpretation of our Constitu-
tion handed down by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison—
“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial branch to say what 
the law is”55—and given the premise that “international law is part of our 
law,”56 there is nothing at all unusual in the notion that judges have the task 
of deciding what international law is as it may be applicable in any given 
situation properly before the judicial branch for resolution. 
During the oral argument in Sosa, Justice Antonin Scalia—both on 
the bench and off a vocal opponent of the relevance of international law to 
the constitutional task of American judges—challenged counsel for the re-
  
 52 See Benjamin Perryman, Eve La Hay’s War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts 36 
QUEEN'S L.J. 673, 680 (2008) (“Discerning what amounts to customary international law is at 
best an imprecise process.”). 
 53 Robert Cryer, Superior Scholarship on Superior Orders an Appreciation of Yoram 
Dinstein’s The Defence of ‘Obedience to Superior Orders’ in International Law, 9 J. INT'L 
CRIM. JUST. 959, 972 (2011) (book review). E-mail from Ralph G. Steinhardt, Professor of 
Law, George Washington Univ. Law School, to Andrew Dorchak, Head of Reference and 
Foreign/International Law Specialist, Case Western Reserve Univ. Law Library (Oct. 12, 
2011, 19:54 EST) (on file with Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law) (explain-
ing that lex nada was coined as joking contrast to established law to the law in the process of 
evolution). 
 54 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.  
 55 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803). 
 56 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.  
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spondent.57 He said, “[t]he problem I have with your proposal is that it 
leaves it up to the courts to decide what the law of nations is.”58 This, ap-
parently, was meant to suggest that there is some fatal flaw in the claim that 
human rights law is a corpus juris actually speaking the language of indi-
vidual legal rights and individual legal obligations. 
Yet that “problem” has never deterred the U.S. judiciary from doing 
its job. In Filartiga, and in every ATS case since, courts have had to decide 
whether torture,59 extrajudicial killings,60 arbitrary detention (as in Sosa 
itself),61 transborder kidnapping (as in the first visit of the Sosa case to the 
Supreme Court thirteen years earlier),62 or other alleged international human 
rights abuses are sufficient to constitute acts contrary to the law of nations.63 
Overall, the courts have been—as they usually are—moderate and 
incremental in their approach to defining the law of human rights.64 With 
the additional guidance provided by the decision in Sosa, they have contin-
ued on this path. Yes, determining the content of international law is not 
always easy. Yes, there is no statute book and there are no legislative pro-
nouncements to consult, and no texts that all agree are definitive, even if 
occasionally opaque. Yes, there are instances in which competing parties 
are able to deploy competing authorities before the court, advocating com-
peting outcomes, and yes, in some instances the authorities themselves may 
be in agreement about very little. 
But common law judges are familiar with the task of deriving legal 
principles from stuff far murkier than printed compilations contained in 
codes. There is no end of authoritative guidance. The Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, for example, outlines the three primary sources of 
international law (treaties, custom, and “general principles of law recog-
  
 57 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 739–51 (2004).  
 58 Transcript of Oral Argument at 43–44, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) 
(No. 03-339), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_trans 
cripts/03-339.pdf; Steven M. Schneebaum, The Paquete Habana Sails On: International Law 
in U.S. Courts After Sosa, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 91, 94 (2005). 
 59 E.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876.  
 60 E.g., In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 61 See generally Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.  
 62 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992) (“The fact of respondent's 
forcible abduction does not therefore prohibit his trial in a court in the United States for 
violations of the criminal laws of the United States.”). 
 63 Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, commit-
ted in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”). 
 64 Jennifer Levine, Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation: Adjudicating on “Foreign Territory,” 
30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 101, 101–15 (detailing the progress of U.S. courts defining 
the law of human rights).  
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nized by civilized nations”),65 and provides that the writings of jurists and 
scholars may be of service as a subsidiary source.66 Identifying the sources 
of international law is not an exercise in charting a course through chaos. 
In recent years, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have 
had to determine the content and the applicability of international law in a 
number of cases. They have not shied from the task. They have considered 
whether, and to what extent, detainees at Guantanamo Bay are entitled to 
rights referenced in treaties signed by the United States, such as the Geneva 
Conventions.67 They have been required to consider whether an individual 
may bring a claim against the U.S. Government for allegedly transferring 
him to the custody of a third state for interrogation that might have included 
torture.68 
In short, confronting the alleged indeterminacy of the law—the dif-
ficulty of finding it, interpreting it, and applying it to cases at hand—comes 
with the job of judging. That the law may be elusive and difficult to identify 
provides no justification for judges who may prefer to decline to play the 
roles assigned to them by a constitutional structure. 
C.  Inefficiency 
It is not arrogant for U.S. courts to hear cases alleging human rights 
violations in foreign countries. Nor does the difficulty in mapping the con-
tours of the applicable law provide a rational basis for declining to decide 
hard cases.  
But judicial resources are finite, and judges all over the world are 
notoriously overworked and underpaid. Why should Magistrate Judge Kay, 
or District Judge Kessler, have been required to put aside a full docket of 
local criminal and civil disputes to hear about something that allegedly hap-
pened on the other side of the planet, among foreigners who had no discern-
ible connection with the United States? 
This is a difficult question to answer. But it invites another ques-
tion, which as a long-time trial lawyer I have often contemplated: why 
should the public authorities of our Government ever involve themselves in 
deciding the proper outcome of a dispute between private individuals? Why 
should eight citizens of Prince George’s County, Maryland, for example, 
paid with public funds, have been asked to sit as a jury to decide whether 
my client Vincent P. Mona or his son Mark Mona was telling the truth in 
  
 65 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 562–64 (2006) (considering the applica-
tion of the Geneva Conventions to the detainees at Guantanamo).  
 68 See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563–65 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
File: Schneebaum 2 Created on: 2/18/2012 11:46:00 AM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:33:00 PM 
2011] HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 197 
their inconsistent renditions of the foundation, governance, and board deci-
sions of Mona Electric Group, Inc., a private corporation?69 
The answer, I believe, reflects a fundamental commitment of our 
society, and a fundamental role that we want the law and the courts to play 
in that society. The entire regime of civil (as opposed to criminal) jurispru-
dence is grounded in the idea that the enforcement of obligations owed by 
private citizens to one another is a legitimate matter of public cognizance.70  
Courts thus exist not only to defend the rights of society as a collec-
tivity: that is, public order, whose protection is the province of the criminal 
law. They are tasked with determining and enforcing private rights as well. 
Those rights may derive from many sources, including private agreements 
(i.e., contracts) between consenting individual participants often entered 
with no outside oversight at all. A contract that you and I form is a private 
legal regime, governing our conduct vis-à-vis each other, and subject to 
regulation by the public authorities should either of us contend that the other 
has acted inconsistently with his or her undertaking. To be sure, there are 
rules and procedures that must be observed by the party invoking judicial 
remedies. But if those rules are satisfied, then the state will dedicate its own 
resources, both human and financial, to helping us to resolve our dispute. 
The state does have an interest in the outcome, because predictability, cer-
tainty, fairness, and stability are values that the state regards as beneficial 
for the entire polity.71 
Beyond this system of consensual private law—private regimes that 
delineate the rights we individual citizens agree to create and to recognize—
the state also defines the duties and responsibilities that we all have with 
respect to each other even absent any agreement. If you have a license from 
the public authorities to operate a motor vehicle, you are under an obligation 
to the state to do so in a manner approved by and consistent with a code of 
laws.72 If you drive too fast, or cross a double yellow line, the authorities 
may determine that you are posing a threat to public order, triggering the 
coercive power of the state itself to be deployed against you. You may be 
required to pay a fine, or to refrain from exercising the privilege of driving 
  
 69 Mona v. Mona Electric Group, Inc., 934 A.2d 450 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007). I have 
selected this example from litigation in which I have been personally involved over the 
course of a career in the private practice of civil law. 
 70 The state’s commitment to use public resources to resolve civil disputes is guaranteed in 
the Constitution itself. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (giving courts jurisdiction to resolve civil 
disputes as well as criminal disputes); U.S. CONST. amend. VII (promising trial by jury in 
civil cases with more the twenty dollars in controversy).  
 71 E.W. Thomas, Fairness and Certainty in Adjudication: Formalism v Substantialism, 9 
OTAGO L. REV. 459, 464–65 (1999) (discussing the peoples’ need for fairness and predicta-
bility in order to prepare their affairs in advance). 
 72 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511 (West 2011) (outlining the responsibilities, 
offenses and penalties for violating traffic laws).  
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for a defined period of time. If the offense is serious enough, you may even 
be deprived of your liberty.  
But in addition to the obligations you owe to the state, and the right 
that the state may have to enforce those duties, you also owe something of a 
different nature to me: the guy crossing with the light and in the crosswalk 
(or driving in my own car just ahead of you, or just behind you). You owe 
me what the law of torts has come to call a “duty of care,”73 and if you 
breach that duty to me and cause injury as a result, I may invoke the public 
authority of the law to seek a private remedy from you.74 Your liability for 
that remedy is analytically quite separate from your guilt or innocence of 
charges that you have violated your obligations to the state. 
My point in this meander through basic legal principles is simply to 
show something we all already know: that the civil law provides powerful 
and vital mechanisms for the protection of rights private individuals have 
against one another, despite the absence of any claim on the part of the state 
that public rights have been affected.  
Adjudicating such matters, however, is always going to involve a 
substantial helping of inefficiency, for several reasons. First, given that the 
state itself is not a party to the dispute resolution procedure, the framing of 
issues and the presentation of evidence are going to require not only careful 
scrutiny of the kind that emerges naturally from robust, adversarial advoca-
cy, but also procedures to promote fairness, and rules to deter and to punish 
cheating. Second, in a civil case, the very existence of the underlying duty, 
as well as the fact of the alleged breach, is likely to be in issue, broadening 
the scope of admissible evidence and legal argument. Third, the parties 
themselves will likely disagree on how to define the scope of the dispute, 
therefore potentially contesting the very boundaries of the territory they are 
asking the courts to explore and to demarcate. 
Even the most straightforward negligence case requires courts to 
confront such questions. The key witness lives across the state line: how 
will his testimony at trial be compelled? The defendant is declining to re-
spond to certain discovery requests: should we defer scheduled trial dates to 
decide whether her reasons are defensible? The plaintiff insists that his 
damages are exacerbated because he had a pre-existing health condition, but 
the medical records are ambiguous and the doctor who created them is una-
vailable: do we proceed without this evidence? 
Sorting out rights that private citizens have—or claim to have—
against one another is by its nature an inefficient, frustrating, but at the same 
time necessary, function of the courts. Over the years, of course, both the 
  
 73 David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1674–76 
(2007). 
 74 Id. 
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legislative and the judicial branches of our government have adopted means 
of containing that inefficiency. Courts may dismiss civil actions when the 
party assigned the burden of proof cannot or will not show a prima facie 
case.75 The party bearing that burden is given to understand, in the litigation 
process, that its ability to do so is determinative of the outcome, whatever 
may be the truth of the underlying allegations. 
Litigation concerning facts arising elsewhere than the locale of the 
courthouse may suffer from inefficiency increased in quantity, but not in 
quality. Since time immemorial, it has been a feature of the common law 
that an individual defendant may be sued in a private cause of action wher-
ever he can be found, and where he has a “presence” as that term may be 
defined by individual legal or constitutional systems.76 Indeed, in his land-
mark decision for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Filartiga, Judge 
Irving Kaufman cited a 1774 decision of Lord Mansfield, in which the Eng-
lish High Court found “not a color of doubt but that any action that is transi-
tory may be laid in any county in England, though the matter arises beyond 
the seas.”77 This has to be the case if the power of the courts to enforce pri-
vate rights is not to be rendered illusory whenever the defendant adopts the 
simple expedient of decamping to another jurisdiction. 
Our judicial branch has developed an entire toolkit for determining 
when it is simply without the ability to perform its fact-finding function 
with respect to a case which it otherwise would have the power to adjudi-
cate. One such device is the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which per-
mits courts to refrain from proceeding in certain cases on the grounds that 
they are thoroughly foreign and unconnected to the forum.78 Such is our 
commitment to keeping the courthouse doors open to individuals who claim 
violations of their rights, however, that application of the doctrine depends 
on the defendant’s ability to show not only the inefficiency of proceeding in 
the court chosen by the plaintiff, but the availability of an alternative loca-
tion capable and competent to do justice.79 If the remedy offered by the al-
ternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is in reality 
no remedy at all, the court must proceed to decide the case before it no mat-
  
 75 George Nils Herlitz, The Meaning of the Term “Prima Facie,” 55 LA. L. REV. 391, 
394–95 (1994) (discussing the English and American roots of the prima facie case).  
 76 James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implica-
tion for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 230–35 (2004) (describing the different 
standards for personal jurisdiction in state and federal courts).  
 77 Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B.); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 855. 
 78 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251–52 (1981) (holding that the 
forum non conveniens doctrine is designed to help courts avoid being mired in issues of 
comparative law and to disincentivize foreign plaintiffs from bringing suit in U.S. courts 
merely to seek more favorable civil litigation outcomes). 
 79 Id. at 248–49. 
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ter how inconvenient it might be to do so (although of course, in these as in 
virtually all civil matters it is still the plaintiff’s burden to prove prima facie 
entitlement to relief).80 
It is not an accident or a coincidence that U.S. courts have only very 
rarely entertained motions to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds in 
human rights litigation. The reason is that the states in which these cases 
arise, and whose officials stand accused of violations of basic human rights, 
are also characteristically unable to provide mechanisms in which the gov-
ernment and its agents can be held liable for their failure to abide by their 
commitments, whether deriving from treaty, custom, general principles, or 
any other source of law.  
Plaintiffs such as those in Lumintang, in other words, have nowhere 
else to go. As their actions sound in tort, and they are seeking to vindicate 
private and not public rights, if they can find those accused in the United 
States, subject to the personal jurisdiction of our courts, they may rely on 
the ancient notion of transitory torts to file suit here, and to have their cases 
heard in our courts.81 
International law is part of the law of this nation, and when the re-
quirements of international law are “specific, universal, and obligatory,” 
and the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction here, there is no analyti-
cal difference between a case alleging torture in Paraguay by this defendant 
in violation of binding norms of both domestic and international jurispru-
dence, and others in which it is contended that the defendant breached a 
contract in Switzerland, or that he caused a traffic accident in Canada. None 
of these by its nature requires the courts to exceed the province assigned to 
them by our Constitution. In none are considerations of inefficiency allowed 
to displace the courts’ constitutional mandate. All are consistent with this 
nation’s adherence to its tradition of providing a safe place where a neutral 
judge or jury will evaluate the evidence and apply the law.  
IV. 
Whether judicial resources should be spent on human rights cases 
arising overseas is, of course, ultimately a matter for legislatures to address. 
But the change in the law demanded by those who would close the court-
house doors to such disputes would be radical. For one thing, there has nev-
er been a bar to bringing human rights abuse cases in state courts of general 
jurisdiction, which do not require the ATS to pave the way. In those courts, 
plaintiffs like the Filartigas, or the alleged victims of torture or forced dis-
  
 80 Id. at 254–55.  
 81 21 C.J.S. Courts § 29 (2011).  
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appearances in Haiti,82 could simply plead their cases, casting onto their 
defendants the challenge of attempting to justify human rights abuses in the 
face of the requirements of international and municipal law. 
What is the logic that would exclude this category of cases from 
federal judicial cognizance? The assertion of subject-matter jurisdiction 
over such disputes is not imperialistic, nor does it require the courts to as-
certain and to apply a body of jurisprudence that is indeterminate or incho-
ate. And while there is an element of inefficiency in attempting to perform 
fact-finding in Washington, D.C., regarding a massacre in Timor-Leste, it is 
not substantially different from trying to ascertain the facts of what hap-
pened in a corporate boardroom across town, or in the mind of a mother 
who absconds with her child in violation of a custody order. Fact-finding is 
always a frustrating process, for many reasons, some practical, and some 
built into the system itself. But if judges maintain courtroom discipline and 
enforce the rules—especially those relating to burdens of proof—those frus-
trations can be overcome and decisions can be made with relative confi-
dence. 
We live in a world in which virtually every aspect of the law—from 
contracts to environmental regulation, from taxation to family law—now 
bears international implications. The World Wide Web, by virtue simply of 
being worldwide, reminds us daily that the law and its subjects can no long-
er be contained neatly within national borders. In light of these develop-
ments, it would be irresponsible in the extreme for policy-makers now to 
move in the opposite direction.  
That such a move would be irresponsible, however, does not mean 
that it would not be popular. In 2010, 70% of the voters in the State of Ok-
lahoma voted to adopt an amendment to their Constitution, which reads in 
relevant part as follows: 
The Courts provided for [elsewhere in the Constitution], when exercising 
their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in 
the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United 
States Code, federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, established 
common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant 
thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the United States pro-
vided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making ju-
dicial decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other na-
  
 82 Jean v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 2005). In Jean, as in a number of other 
ATS cases, including the ones against former President Marcos, the plaintiffs actually col-
lected a substantial monetary judgment. Id.  
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While it is easy to write off this effort as jingoistic or simply igno-
rant, it evidences a popular sentiment that may not be ignored. Within the 
last decade, the previous Administration in Washington attempted not only 
in such human rights litigation as Sosa, but more broadly in its effort to jus-
tify its own violations of international law, to persuade the courts that the 
international legal regime is not really law, and is not binding on the United 
States. These efforts were thwarted at every turn, albeit sometimes by a 
sharply-divided Supreme Court.  
That these attempts have not abated provides, in my view, reason to 
agree that the title of this conference, “International Law in Crisis,” is no 
panicked exaggeration. The crisis will require that those of us who are con-
fident in the vitality and the necessity of international law—to guard, as 
domestic law does in its sphere, against the abuse of power—make sure that 
its roots in the U.S. legal system continue to be protected and respected. 
This will not be easy, but one is encouraged by the calm, professional, and 
deeply conservative approaches U.S. district court judges have taken toward 
ATS litigation brought before them, especially since Sosa. In these cases, as 
in all the cases they must decide every day, courts review the caselaw of 
precedential value, and apply time-honored and traditional methods for de-
termining whether they have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the 
person of the defendant, and whether the plaintiff is able to muster sufficient 
evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact might conclude that she is 
entitled to a remedy. 
Following this process is how our courts have functioned properly, 
according to the standards laid out in our Constitution, and that is how they 
should always function. Human rights litigation is of a piece with lawsuits 
brought since the founding of our country, and in England before that, in 
which individuals have sought to protect themselves against violations of 
their legal rights. It is the defenders of these traditions, not those who would 
uproot them, overturning centuries of tradition, who are the conservatives.  
  
 83 H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2nd Sess. State Question 755 (Okla. 2010). The “Save Our 
State Amendment” was presented to Oklahoma voters as State Question 755, and after they 
approved it was immediately held by a federal court to be unconstitutional. Awad v. Ziriax, 
754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff'd, 2012 WL 50636 (10th Cir. 2012). No 
serious constitutional law scholar would be willing to defend such a law, and efforts to revise 
it to avoid problems of facial unconstitutionality have so far been stymied in the State Legis-
lature. But similar efforts have been mounted in other states, and legislation has been intro-
duced in the last several U.S. Congresses to restrict the freedom of judges to apply, or even 
to reference, international law in deciding cases before them. See Aaron Fellmeth, Interna-
tional and Foreign Laws in the U.S. State Legislatures, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (May 
26, 2011), http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110526.pdf.  
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To the question asked by a hypothetical judge about an ATS com-
plaint—“What is this case doing here?”—then, the answer is this: 
“Your Honor, federal jurisdiction here is guaranteed according to a 
statute as old as the Republic. The defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Court, and the plaintiff alleges the violation of rights arising under inter-
national law, which is and has always been part of the law of our land. The 
case now awaits your decision, which must be rendered in keeping with the 
oath of office you took upon your commissioning, to ‘administer justice 
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, . . . 
faithfully and impartially [to] discharge and perform all the duties upon 
[you] as a federal judge under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.’ So help you God.”84 
That should be a satisfactory answer for any judge. And it should 
remind all of us that international law is law, providing inter alia for the 
rights of individuals wherever they may be located, simply by virtue of our 
common humanity.85  
  
 84 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2011) (laying out the official language for the federal judicial oath).  
 85 The case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum was argued before the United States Su-
preme Court on February 28, 2012. The issue presented concerned whether federal courts 
may obtain jurisdiction over corporations in ATS cases, on the grounds that they may validly 
be accused of having committed the “violations of the law of nations” that constitute a juris-
dictional prerequisite under the statute. A week later, the Court sua sponte restored the Ki-
obel case to its docket for reargument, on the broader question of “[w]hether and under what 
circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recognize a cause of 
action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other 
than the United States.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10-1491, 80 U.S.L.W. 3506 
(Mar. 5, 2012). In other words, the Supreme Court has invited briefing and argument on 
precisely the question raised in this essay: “What is this case doing here?” 
